We study equilibrium investment strategies of rms competing in stochastic dynamic market settings and facing two types of investment structures: investment with signicant lead time (or time-to-build) and investment without (or minor) lead time. We investigate how investment behavior changes when investment is subject to time-to-build versus when it is not. We characterize equilibrium investment strategies under several information structures and compare results to the social optimum. We oer some new results. The model predicts that, controlling for demand, and production and investment costs, investments and outputs can be higher in progressive industries (which often exhibit time-to-build) than in fast-paced industries (where time-to-build is insignicant). Furthermore, for both investment types (investment with or without time-to-build) we oer a novel equilibrium in which rms incrementally invest. This behavior is driven by demand uncertainty and capacity constraints. Also, expected outputs are lower than Cournot outputs as rms face uncertainty. Moreover, the amount of uncertainty has dierent eects over investment types.
Introduction
Some capital investment projects can be completed with alternative production technologies. First, consider a market where rms run technologies which are highly capital intensive and rm invest- * I thank the editor Herbert Dawid, associate editor and two referees for constructive remarks and suggestions. ments take time to be productive, that is, there is a lead time between investment and production.
In other words, investment is subject to a time-to-build constraint. Next, consider another market in which rms operate production technologies which exhibit lower or no time-to-build constraint (relative to the former market). We coin investment in this market as instantaneous investment, because rms can make their investments productive in a short time period or without a signicant lag. An example for the former structure is a power market which is heavily based on nuclear or hydroelectric generators (e.g., Norway's electricity market is based on hydropower, and it is nuclear power in France). If an entrepreneur or a rm chooses to invest in this market, he/she realizes that investment can take years to be productive. For instance, the largest hydroelectric dam was constructed in China, and it took about 20 years to be completed, from construction to fully operational stages. On the other hand, if he/she decides to invest in the latter market in which main production technologies are, say, wind, solar and natural gas-red generators (e.g., Denmark power market is predominantly wind-based supported by natural-gas generators), the investment can be productive instantly or with a short delay (relative to the former structure), as these production technologies can be purchased in any size from the energy technology suppliers and added to the production line.
For example, a 5 MW capacity wind farm can be operational in a month from investment decision to production. To give dierent examples, consider cell phone industry in which rms (e.g., Samsung, Apple, and Sony) introduce their new models at least once a year. However, car producers such as Toyota, Honda, GM, and Chrysler introduce their new versions (generations) of models in about 7 years. Similarly, for passenger plane makers such as Boeing, Airbus, or Bombardier it takes several years to develop a new model airplane, and then they make lengthy ight tests before they start carrying passengers. In these examples, while car and plane sectors could be viewed as industries with signicant lead times, the cell phone producers could be considered operating in an industry with a minor (or insignicant) lead time. We intend to compare the market outcomes given the investment opportunities in these two distinct markets. Specically, we intend to address the following questions: in which market structure do rms perform better? Should an incumbent rm attempt to earn higher prots by investing in its own market, or in a new market? More generally, what are the eects of addition of time-to-build to capital investment competition?
Capacity investments which are the main subject of this paper are worth billions of dollars every year. World energy investment outlook report of International Energy Agency (IEA) (2003, 2014) has questioned capacity investments that are required in the power sector. It nds that in the To shed light on capital investment issues, we initially start with a two-period imperfect competition model. There are two non-identical rms who face demand uncertainty before making their investment decisions. Firm production is constrained by capacity and capacity accumulation is endogenous. Under a time-to-build constraint, investment will be available to use in the following period. In the rst period rms compete for outputs. At the same time, they make investment decisions given that demand is uncertain in the next period. After uncertainty unfolds in the second period, rms choose production quantities. Under no time-to-build constraint (i.e., instantaneous investment), rms can invest and produce simultaneously and non-cooperatively. In this structure, rms can invest in the initial and nal periods while rms can only invest at the outset under the former structure (time-to-build) due to the lag between production and investment. The model incorporates uncertainty and production capacity constraints into a dynamic game-theoretic setting, as well as dierent information structures (i.e., equilibrium concepts) and investment types. These features are the key ingredients of our modeling aspect and add realism to the capital accumulation 1 In a recent report published by International Energy Agency (IEA, 2016), available at https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/REPOWERINGMARKETS.pdf in Figure 1 . 2, we observe that electricity markets have been restructured in most jurisdictions in the world, with dierent degrees of competition being introduced both in wholesale and retail sectors. See also Genc (2012) for restructuring issues.
competition. We also extend the model to three periods which will allow rms to invest consecutively. The number of possible equilibria will increase with the addition of new time stage and the equilibrium investment strategies will become an involved function of model parameters.
We compare equilibrium investment strategies under two information structures: Markov perfect and open-loop approaches. This is to compare strategic to preemptive investments. While these information structures and hence the equilibrium concepts have been commonly used in deterministic dynamic games literature (Reynolds, 1987 There is a vast literature that has examined capital investments in dierent optimization and market settings. They mainly utilize time-to-build constraint for general equilibrium or corporate investment models. Articles studying capacity investment games under uncertainty remain sparse.
Situations involving time-to-build have rarely been at the core of such studies. Our contribution is to examine and compare market performances (prices, prots, outputs) under dierent investment structures (time-to-build versus no time-to-build) over various equilibrium concepts (openloop, Markov perfect, and social optimum) in dynamic game settings under demand uncertainty to show the role of production constraints and the number of periods on investment behavior. Some of our new ndings are as follows. Controlling for demand, and production and investment costs, we determine the conditions under which investments and outputs are higher in progressive industries and the conditions under which they are higher in fast-paced industries. Also, for both investment types (investment with or without time-to-build) we oer a novel equilibrium in which rms incrementally invest. This behavior is driven by demand uncertainty and capacity constraints.
Moreover, expected outputs are lower than Cournot outputs as rms face uncertainty. In addition, the amount of uncertainty has dierent eects on investment types.
We nd that equilibrium investment strategies are multiple under both investment structures.
However, the number of equilibrium strategies is higher under instantaneous investment structure than under the time-to-build. Also, with instantaneous investment rms may prefer delaying their investments in the initial period when uncertainty increases, and then boost investment in the second period. With time-to-build, investment decisions will be made only once and before the realization of uncertain demand. Also the equilibrium investment per rm increases in demand uncertainty variable. Moreover, production capacity constraints impact investment decisions. If a rm is subject to a time-to-build constraint and undertakes investment, then its capacity constraint will always be binding in the high demand state and production equals total capacity. If a rm does not face a time lag, then it never invests when demand is low. However, in the case of high demand realization its investment will be fully utilized and its production constraint will bind. Finally, based on the information structure (Markov perfect versus open-loop) we nd that equilibrium investment predictions dier as long as rms are asymmetric in terms of capacity constraints. In particular, if one rm's capacity constraint is binding and other rm's is not then Markov perfect investment will always be higher than the open-loop investment no matter what type of investment is executed; otherwise they will yield the same investment predictions.
Literature Review
A common assumption in most of the investment literature is that investment at a given time is productive in the same period, that is, there is no lag between production and investment. An alternative assumption is that investment takes time to be part of capital stock. In reality, investment does not become productive instantly for many industries and there is some lead time between investment and production. As noted by Koeva (2000) time-to-build constraint is empirically observable, and it varies from industry to industry and is on average in the range of 13 to 86 months.
2 However, most studies have not paid attention to this aspect and assumed instantaneous investment in strategic capital acquisition. A justication for a no time-to-build constraint could be that rms might have already overinvested and some of their production capacities might be staying idle. Using the existing idle capacity with minor maintenance and improvement may be considered as instantaneous investment, and hence no time-to-build constraint. Or, it could be that capacity (such as land, machinery, equipment, or buildings) can be purchased from an intermediate market 2 While time-to-build varies over industries, the length of time-to-build is often variable within an industry and can create additional source of uncertainty in decision making process (e.g., construction of Areva?s powerful nuclear reactors called the EPR, Evolutionary Power Reactor, as pointed by a referee). and put into production process instantly (or in a short period of time).
Most papers in the capital accumulation literature (e.g., Spence (1979) , Dixit (1980) , Reynolds (1987), Cellini and Lambertini (1998), Dockner et al. (2000) and Figuières (2009) , among others) assumed market settings with no uncertainty and no lag between production and investment (i.e., instantaneous investment). They studied capacity investment games mainly within the linearquadratic framework and under various assumptions including nite-time, innite-time, and precommitment versus no commitment. These papers oered valuable insights on investment behavior.
However, there can be many factors that create signicant lag between the investment decision and the start of the production process. To our knowledge, only a few papers in game-theoretic literature (e.g., Grenadier (2000 Grenadier ( , 2002 In terms of explaining the eect of time-to-build on equilibrium behavior, Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2003) is closer to the current paper. While they do not compare the total investments and market outcomes with time-to-build, which is parameterized and is between zero and innity, to the ones without time-to-build, we compare the market performance and investment dynamics with and without time-to-build. They mainly focus on equilibrium characterization with time-to-build and explain how the duration of time-to-build impacts market outcomes. The main conclusion of Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2003) is that social welfare is mostly decreasing in time-to-build.
However, this result can reverse when one takes into account for the eect on equilibrium existence. This is indeed similar to our nding. However, while they explain their result in terms of the duration of time-to-build, we explain our result in terms of the number of investment opportunities and initial capacity endowments. Granted that the market structure in Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2003) is fundamentally dierent than our paper: they solve an innite horizon game in which there is one time uncertainty, and assume that there is either demand or no demand for the product, and rms are symmetric and do not have any initial productive capacities, and the length of time-to-build could vary. We assume that rms always face uncertainty before they make investment decisions, there is always demand for the product, and demand will increase with some probability to justify the capital expenditure (i.e., investment). Furthermore, in our model rm productions are bounded by production capacity and rms are allowed to have non-identical capacities. The critical assumptions of their model which create some dierent (equilibrium) results than ours are that i) in their model rms can invest after the resolution of uncertainty, however in our paper rms always make investments under uncertainty; ii) while they solve innite horizon game with one time uncertainty which is resolved at time 0 after which there is a known and xed demand for a product, we solve two-and three-period models with multiple uncertainties on demand growth; iii) in their model the amount of uncertainty determines which equilibrium exists, in our model capacity endowments mainly determine the equilibrium type.
In terms of modeling aspect, a closely related paper to this research is Garcia and Shen (2010) , who developed a dynamic duopoly model with a stochastically growing demand. Their production and investment costs are identical to our paper. Both papers (Garcia and Shen and this paper) study investment with time-to-build under uncertainty. The uncertainty modeling is the same. Demand either goes up or stays the stay with a known probability distribution function. While, Garcia and Shen do not intend to explore the eect of time-to-build, which is a modeling assumption in their paper, we explore the impact of investment lag by comparing investment outcomes with and without time-to-build. While they oer investment characterization for a given period, they do not examine multiple investment strategies and how an investment in a given period would impact the investment strategy in the following period. We oer equilibrium investment strategies made over time (in the three-period model for investment with time-to-build, and in the two-period model for instantaneous investment). Furthermore, while we specically examine the impact of demand uncertainty on investment strategies with and without time-to-build, Garcia and Shen do not mention the eect of uncertainty. Both papers characterize the social optimum investment proles, and nd that rms with market power underinvest relative to social optimum. Also, our investment strategy characterization proposed (in Propositions 1 and 2 in section 4) for investment with time-to-build corresponds to their main result in Theorem 1. However, we also oer a dierent equilibrium result in our Proposition 11 (in the case of three periods) in which we characterize consecutive investment strategies in three periods. Consequently, Garcia and Shen and this current research are in similar spirit for Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) characterization of the duopolistic competition for investment with time-to-build. The key results (such as MPE investment strategy characterization and the result that the duopolistic market fails to induce the socially optimal level of capacity) in Garcia and Shen are also available in this current paper. However, our main dierences arise when i) comparing market performance with and without time-to-build; ii) extending the duopoly game under three dierent assumptions of demand intercept uncertainty. They nd that the impact of volatility on optimal investment could be negligible when time-to-build is present. However, in our market structure, which is imperfectly competitive market with a simple demand distribution, a rm's strategic investments with time-to-build increase in demand uncertainty variable.
Besides the game-theoretic capacity investment analyses, there is a stream of literature examining lumpy capacity investments using real options framework (e.g., Li and Wang (2010), Chen (2012) , and Hahn and Kuhn (2012)). Even though time-to-build constraint is omitted in most of the game-theoretic models, it has been employed in growth literature emphasizing optimal corporate investment decisions. The corporate investment literature mainly incorporates real options view of investment and the standard net present value rule. To explain business cycles, some optimal growth models have incorporated time-to-build. Kydland and Prescott (1982) 
Model
We examine a duopolistic non-cooperative competition model of irreversible investment under demand uncertainty. In this capital/capacity accumulation game we analyze investment behavior and compare the market outcomes in the presence of the two distinct investment structures: i) instantaneous investment which may be viewed as purchasing capacity from the competitive capacity market and making this investment productive instantly; ii) investment with lead time under which rms may choose to build their own capacities or extend the existing ones that take time to be productive.
We assume that rms produce a homogeneous output (e.g., electricity).
We characterize investment strategies using Markov perfect (and open-loop Nash equilibrium presented in the extension section) solution concept(s). Both types of equilibria have been commonly used to study investment proles of rms in non-cooperative competition settings without uncertainty. These concepts generally lead to dierent market predictions and investment proles, and hence we will compare and contrast the market outcomes under both frameworks.
For any market setting time evolves discretely and state variables (demand and capacity states) have a continuous support. For a given demand distribution and capacity state vectors, each rm may prefer to increase its production capacity before demand uncertainty unfolds. To keep the model manageable, we start with a two-period game t ∈ {0, 1}, where there are two possible demand states at time 1 (in theoretical framework two-stage models are common and it is assumed that they provide a good approximation for investment projects). We will extend it to three periods, in which there will be four additional demand states at time 2, to track the evolution of investment strategies.
Following Garcia and Shen (2010) the inverse market demand is P t (Q t ) =p − σ t Q t , which is the price that consumers face for the total consumption quantity Q t , where the slope term σ t has the following distribution.
) with probability θ σ t with probability (1 − θ)
At the initial period (t = 0) assume σ 0 = 1, For simplicity, the production of q units of homogeneous product costs C(q) = cq with c ≥ 0.
In general rms could have dierent marginal costs and the analysis will hold even if c = 0, as can be seen from the expressions (2) and (4) below. Similar to Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2003) and Garcia and Shen (2010) , investment in production capacity costs F (I) = f I for investment level I ∈ + , where f ≥ 0. It is common to assume away a xed cost component in the investment cost function, as the xed cost creates non-convexity and hence the possibility of lumpy investments.
There is no innovation so that capacity expansion does not impact the marginal production cost. The endogenous capacity states evolve as follows. In the instantaneous investment case, the production capacity at time t + 1 will be equal to the production capacity at time t plus the investment made at the time t + 1, that is K t+1 = K t + I t+1 . For the investment with time-to-build, the production capacity at time t + 1 is K t+1 = K t + I t in which the investment made at time t will be available for production at time t + 1. We assume away capacity depreciation as there are only a few periods in the game. To include capacity depreciation into the model K t should be replaced by (1 − τ )K t , where τ would be depreciation rate between 0 and 1. We will examine the impact of each investment type on market outcomes.
There are two rms i and j, and i = j, and each rm is risk-neutral and maximizes its expected sum of prots independently of its rival. We assume an ongoing competition so that each rm has K k0 units of production capacity, k = i, j, and has the option of increasing its capacity through 
4 Investment with Lead Time
Although businesses often prefer a shorter lead time, which is the required amount of time between starting and nishing a process (including pre-processing, processing and post processing), it is an important constraint in supply chain management.
This section examines investment behavior when there is one period lead time between investment and production. Firms i and j start with initial capacities K i0 ≥ 0 and K j0 ≥ 0 which can be dierent.
Producer i maximizes its expected sum of prots to choose its investment and output strategy denoted ψ i = (I it , q it ) and solves
, where E 0 is the expectation operator at time zero. There are two states at time 1, namely upstate 3 Because there are two periods, we ignore a discount rate, which can be easily embedded into the above expected prot function, does not change our results qualitatively.
It will enter the equilibrium investment function linearly. Our rst result describes rms' investment policies under Markov perfect solution.
3 Instead of writing 1u (1d) to represent the upstate (downstate) in period 1, we simply write u (d).
Proposition 1: For rms k = i, j, i = j let K i0 , K j0 ≥ 0 be their initial capacities at t = 0.
Assume that investment exhibits one period lead time and there are two demand states at t = 1, namely u and d. Then the Markov perfect equilibrium investment strategies at t = 0 are:
Proof: See the Appendix.
Observe that investment decisions of the rms change with respect to the model parameters and initial capacities. Firm investments would be identical if their initial capacities were the same. It is clear that equilibrium investment quantity under the low initial capacity must be higher than the investment under the high initial capacity. That is, when the initial capacity is low, satisfying
kd , even it is smaller than Cournot output at the initial period, rms will invest to prot from future demand states. When the initial capacity is high, satisfying q c kd ≤ K k0 < q c ku , the equilibrium investment will be lower as rms accumulate sucient amount of capacity to meet 4 The Figures 1, 3 , and 4 for regions in capacity states and equilibrium investment strategies in Garcia and Shen (2010) will apply to our analysis of Markov perfect equilibrium with time-to-build.
the highest possible level of future demand. The capacity utilization rate at the nal period will be 100%.
When investment is positive, we nd a bang-bang solution for production. That is, production constraints bind and rms operate at the capacity. This nding is also consistent with Abel and Blanchard (1986), and Zhou (2000) who emphasize that the product markets are often not perfect and hence rms may face binding output constraints. During high demand periods some rms often operate near their capacities in markets such as electricity production and hot spot industries.
Note that even in low demand periods some generators can operate at the capacity. For example, nuclear plants generally operate near capacity, and wind turbines produce electricity at the maximum utilization rate during windy fall season.
When the initial capacity is low, that is 0 ≤ K k0 < q c kd holds, the expected output in the nal
for both rms. Although rms start with dierent initial capacities and invest dierent quantities, their expected outputs will be identical because production and investment costs are the same for both rms. When the initial capacity is high, that is q c kd ≤ K k0 < q c ku holds, the expected output in the nal period becomes
for both rms, because capacity constraint binds in the high demand state and it is interior in the intermediate demand state. In this case, again expected outputs and actual outputs in the nal period will be the same for both rms, as they have the identical production and investment costs and both rm investments only dier in terms of initial capacities.
The following result examines asymmetric equilibrium investment case. Proposition 2: Let rm i be small capacity rm whose initial capacity holds 0 ≤ K i0 ≤ q c iu and rm j be large capacity rm with initial capacity satisfying
. Then rm j does not invest and rm i invests (i.e., I j0 = 0 ≤ I i0 ). Markov perfect equilibrium investment strategies for rm i are:
Under the conditions of Proposition 2 rm j has a high initial capacity, and the small rm i increases its capacity based on the level of its initial capacity and the market parameters, but independently of rm j's capacity.
Observe that when rm i's initial capacity is low, that is 0 ≤ K i0 < q c id , it invests more relative to the investment it undertakes when he starts with high initial capacity, that is q c id ≤ K i0 < q c iu . But it does not invest (following its competitor), when its initial capacity is very high, that is q c iu ≤ K i0 .
The investment made in the low initial capacity case will be totally used in the second period whether demand turns out to be low or high. However, the investment made in the case of a high initial capacity will only benet the high demand scenario, if it unfolds, otherwise this investment will be futile. This is a risky investment because low demand market is possible in the end. However, the rm invests as if he would face the high demand market.
The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2 is akin to Commitment equilibria of Pachecode-Almeida and Zemsky (2003) in which the leader rm invests and the follower does not invest under uncertainty. This type of equilibrium emerges as Stackelberg equilibrium outcome in their model. However, from the outset, we assume Cournot-Nash equilibrium approach in our model, and
Commitment-like equilibrium emerges just due to very asymmetric initial capacities of the rms.
Instantaneous Investment
This section explores investment behavior when rms can instantly increase their production capacities by either acquiring new production technologies or expanding capacities of the existing units via refurbishing/maintenance. Investment is productive instantaneously and there is no (or signicant) lag between production and investment as opposed to the investment with lead time structure.
That is, time-to-build constraint is either negligible or non-existent. In this structure, rms have an option to postpone their investments in the rst period, which is absent from the former structure.
However, for technical reasons (shown in the proofs) equilibrium computations can become harder under this investment type.
5
As an example, in the electricity generation industry some rms can instantly expand their production capacities via purchasing (small-scale) gas-red generators, which are available in various capacity sizes. Alternatively, a photo-voltaic technology (which converts sun lights into thermal energy and then into kinetic energy) or a wind turbine (comprised of blades, gearbox, generator, and
5 In a dierent model Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky, the case of instantaneous investment, which occurs when the investment lag parameter is zero (T=0), is a special case of investment with time-to-build. Their model reduces to two-period model, in which rms can invest in two periods (before and after uncertainty) and production and sales occur in the second period only.
tower) can easily be purchased from the energy equipment suppliers with various sizes of production capacities (a modern wind generator can produce upto 5 MWh electricity). Investment into these technologies can be regarded as instantaneous investment in which these technologies can become productive instantly after they are installed or can take a minor lead time from investment stage (e.g., purchasing equipment) to the production process compared to other technologies such as nuclear and hydro plants, which exhibit signicant lead times from investment to production stages.
Because today's decisions could impact future decisions and protability we characterize Markov perfect Nash equilibrium investment strategies under various market conditions. Therefore, we solve the equilibrium problem backwards so that decisions are subgame perfect.
To examine the impact of instantaneous investment we rst take a close look at one of the periods, say initial period, to see how instantaneous investing is aecting the market outcomes. The objective function of rm i to be maximized at the initial period is
where λ i0 is a multiplier. If both rms are constrained, that is their capacity constraints bind, then equilibrium investment strategies satisfy
i is constrained and rm j's production is interior (and hence rm j does not invest), then rm i's investment is equal to I i0 = (p − c − 2f )/3 − K i0 . If rm i is constrained, and rm j is also constrained but does not invest, then rm i's investment satises
If both rms' productions are interior, then they do not invest and produce at Cournot output
. This simple analysis indicates that if we increase the number of time stages, the possible number of equilibrium investment strategies is going to increase.
Next we analyze the investment behavior when rms compete in two periods in the market.
Let producer i's strategy be s i = (I it , q it ), which is chosen as a solution to the problem:
Although there are multiple MPE investment quantities over the capacity regions, the equilibrium will be unique for a given parameter region. Namely, because we have three demand states (initial 
Committing to Initial Investment
This subsection analyzes equilibrium investment solutions for duopolists when they invest at time zero only. Before examining investment proles, we ask the following question: why do rms invest now and utilize their investments now and in the future given that investment is instantaneous?
We argue that this behavior could be related to, for instance, time constraints imposed by rms' other projects, instant growth incentives, managerial/shareholder pressure, and/or macroeconomic conditions. Alternatively, it might be due to strategic reasons. For example, whether rms are symmetric or asymmetric in initial capacities, one rm may emerge and invest right away to deter the rival rm's incentive to invest. Also, a rm with small capacity may wish to invest right away to be able to compete with a large rival rm in the future high demand market. By investing earlier small rm can increase its size and send a signal to its competitor that it is a contender in the high demand market (if unfolds) and will be able to increase its sales. If, however, intermediate market materializes in the second period, the small rm can expand its market share and increase its cash ow by investing earlier.
Among the reasons of why invest now, mentioned above, the current model encompasses macroeconomic conditions through demand growth and strategic reasons through commitment incentives.
Other reasons are not directly observable in the model setting. If the initial capacity at the outset is low, rms have to invest in the initial period. In addition, they consider the future before they choose the investment quantities in the beginning as it is likely that demand would go up in the next period. Then one rm could pre-commit to invest more at the beginning to be able to benet from the current and the future states and would potentially become a market leader. But the other rm has the same objective and hence would follow the same suit. Therefore, both rms would play commit-commit strategies. This is what is captured in Proposition 3. On the other hand, one of the rms may choose not to commit any investment strategy and play stay put, because of its massive initial capacity endowment. This business strategy is captured in Proposition 4.
Proposition 3: For rms k = i, j, i = j let K i0 , K j0 be their initial capacities at t = 0. Assume that there are two states at t = 1 namely u and d. Then, the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium initial investment strategies at t = 0 are:
Proof: See the Appendix. Thus far we have examined symmetric MPE, the following proposition covers asymmetric equilibrium investment strategies.
Proposition 4: Assume that investment is instantaneous. Let rm i be small capacity rm whose initial capacity holds 0 ≤ K i0 ≤ q c iu and rm j be large capacity rm whose initial capacity
. Then rm j does not invest and rm i invests (i.e., I j0 = 0 ≤ I i0 ), and the Markov perfect equilibrium investment strategies for rm i satisfy:
In this proposition rm j does not invest due to its larger initial capacity. Comparing the investment strategies when there is a lead time versus there is no lead time, we nd that the outcomes in Proposition 2 is same as the ones in Proposition 4, if the capacity constraints are binding only in the demand growth (upstate) case. However, the investment policies are dierent if the constraints bind in all relevant states (as explained in Section 7 in detail).
Delaying and Investing Later
This section examines equilibrium investment policies of competitors when they do not invest at the outset but invest only at the second period which embeds the demand growth scenario. Note that this investment scenario was not possible under time-to-build.
Proposition 5: Let rms k = i, j, i = j start with initial capacities K i0 , K j0 ≥ 0 at t = 0. Then Markov perfect Nash equilibrium investment strategies at t = 1 are:
Note that in equilibrium both rms produce the same level of output which is
no matter what their initial capacities or investment levels are.
Investing in All Periods
When investment is instantaneous, it is possible that rms invest in all periods. Although this never happens under time-to-build, this case has to be examined for the sake of completeness.
6 6 This issue has been raised by an anonymous referee.
In this subsection we will show that rms will invest in both periods only if the initial capacity is very low. Otherwise, they will invest once, either at the beginning or at the end of the period such that they will follow the investment rules described in subsections 5.1 and 5.2 above.
Assume that initial capacity is very low such that it cannot even provide Cournot output in the initial period. That is, it satises K k0 < q c k0 . In this case rms may choose to invest in both periods.
When they invest in both periods, their investments provide benet to all demand states. The prot function that will be maximized, for rm i, becomes
where the prot in the upstate is π iu (.
The maximization of the total prot function with respect to the choice of upstate investment implies ∂π i (.)/∂I iu = 0 for rm i. Solving the same problem for rm j, and then solving the investment best response functions of both rms simultaneously result in
Next rm i optimizes its total prot function with respect to its initial investment, that is
Solving the same problem for rm j, and solving the best response investment functions simultaneously, and then inserting the value of I ku (I k0 ) lead to
Inserting this expression into the investment function above, the second period optimal investment for rm k becomes
. Dierent than the investment at the initial period, the second period investment is irrelevant of initial capacity level, but depends on the demand growth rate as well as other model parameters.
Note that rms never invest in the intermediate state, as they already invested in the initial state, which is identical to the intermediate state in terms of demand. The total investment quantity will
We learn from the above analysis that if the initial capacity is too low (i.e., K k0 < q k0 ), rms can invest in both periods. In this case all capacity constraints in all demand states will bind. This opens the following question: do rms invest in both periods if they start with somewhat intermediate level of capacity (neither high nor low)? This corresponds to the capacity level K k0 ≥ q c k0 and K k0 < q c ku .
When we solve the problem expressed in (6) with this initial capacity level we nd that rms will not invest in the initial period, but invest only in the second period upstate, if it unfolds. Algebraically, we nd that the KKT condition for rm i is (∂Π i /∂I i0 )I i0 = (−f +ρ i0 +ρ iu +ρ id )I i0 = 0, where ρ s are the Lagrange multipliers for the states described in the subscripts. It will follow that ρ i0 = 0 = ρ id because the investment made in the initial period will not be used neither in the initial state nor in the intermediate state. However, ρ iu > 0 will hold because investment made in the upstate will be productive, and the total output will be equal to total capacity. Therefore, I i0 = 0 will hold.
Consequently, this case will boil down to the investment behavior in subsection 5.2, where optimal investment in the nal period will be the one expressed in (9).
This analysis indicates that positive investments in both periods only occur when the initial capacity is too low. Otherwise, rms will either invest in period 0 (subsection 5.1) or invest in period 1 (subsection 5.2).
In the analysis of Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2003) (AZ) for instantaneous investment case, they state (in their Proposition 1) that Firms never make incremental investments. In our analysis above, we show that this type of equilibrium is possible. This is because in their model there is a stage in which rms are allowed to make investment ex post. In our setting rms can make investment ex ante (which is the investment quantity at time zero) and this investment can benet initial period demand as well as future demand which is uncertain at the time of decision making. On the other hand, there is no demand at the initial period in AZ; therefore investment will be carried out after it is certain that demand is positive.
Furthermore, in AZ there are two types of equilibria (in their Proposition 1) when investment is instantaneous: Delay equilibrium and Commit-delay equilibrium. Their Delay equilibrium (i.e., both rms wait and invest after the resolution of uncertainty) is same as our investment characterization in Proposition 5, in which rms invest right after they gure out that they are at the high demand state. Their Commit-delay equilibrium (in which the leader rm invests at the outset and the follower rm delays and invests in the nal period) occurs when uncertainty is not too great (demand uncertainty parameter is suciently high). In this case cost of investing early is less than the benet of committing. In our setting, by modeling choice (i.e., Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept) we do not have Commit-delay type equilibrium. In AZ, rms neither make incremental investments nor carry out ex-ante investments simultaneously. However, these types of equilibria are possible in our setting (in our incremental investment analysis above and Commitment type investment in our Proposition 4).
Socially Optimal Investment
In this section we investigate whether duopoly investment strategies would be dierent than social optimum, which is obtained by solving the social planner's problem through maximizing expected sum of welfare (consumer surplus less production and investment costs). We will analyze the investment behavior with and without time-to-build constraint.
When the investment is subject to time-to-build, the planner chooses outputs and investment to solve the following problem:
In the two-period planning, the optimality conditions are 
If the constraint is binding in both states, then the investment will 
, which is less than
, when the investment is beneting the upstate demand only; ii) the total MPE investment is 2( On the other hand, when the investment is instantaneous or does not exhibit a signicant lag between investment and production the analysis of optimum investment is as follows. The planner chooses all outputs and investment to maximize the total welfare similar to the above analysis.
When investment is carried out in the initial stage only, similar to the time-to-build investment analysis above, the optimality conditions satisfy:
If the production constraints are binding in the upstate only, then the optimal investment will be 
there is no investment. Comparing these optimum investment strategies to the ones under the MPE in Proposition 3, it is clear that duopolists underinvest.
Then we obtain the following result:
Proposition 6: Whether investment is instantaneous or subject to a lead time, rms' total investments under the MPE are lower than socially optimum investment.
The Role of Investment Types
This section compares the investment outcomes based on the investment types (instantaneous vs. time to build). As the propositions 1-5 show, depending on the initial capacity levels of rms, investments made under uncertainty will be productive either in upstate only, or in both initial state and upstate, or in all demand states. One of these investment strategies will unfold based on the parameter regions dened in the previous sections. In each case, we observe some common investment characteristics: investment is decreasing in initial capacity, production and investment costs, and increasing in demand uncertainty. If rms start with large capacity endowments, they may not invest at all or invest little, depending on demand conditions. In the limit, if the initial capacity is innity, there is no need for investment. In all propositions the rate of change of investment strategy with respect to initial capacity is negative. Also, in all propositions the rate of change of investment with respect to investment cost or production cost is negative. Firms tend to invest less when investment costs increase. As the investment quantity is going to be used for production, production cost will also negatively impact the investment. Therefore, higher production and investment costs will lead to lower investments. Also, as explained in detail in Section 8, the derivative of investment strategy with respect to uncertainty (represented by θ, the probability of demand growth) is always positive. This is because favorable resolution of uncertainty implies higher θ which implies higher expected demand and therefore higher investment.
When we rank these investment quantities we nd that the highest level of investments occurs when investment provides benet to all demand states (0, u, d), and the lowest level occurs when it only provides benet to the upstate. The intuition for this result is that for a given level of demand, lower initial capacity entails into higher investment quantity. Although the investment quantity is the largest when the capacity constraints are binding in all states, the outputs are lower than Cournot outputs. Similarly, if the capacity constraint is binding only in the upstate then initial and intermediate state outputs are at their Cournot output levels. Hence, prices (in all states) will be the lowest when the investment is positive and at its lowest level. This is due to the fact that the initial capacity is high and investment provides benet to upstate only, hence consumers enjoy lower prices because of high initial capacities. An implication of this nding in electricity markets context is that excess reserve capacity or installed capacity becomes necessary to depress prices and smooth price hikes.
When investment is subject to a time-to-build, we have seen that investment occurs only once in the two-period model. Depending on the initial capacity level of a rm, the investment will be productive either at the high demand state or at all states in the second period (Proposition 1).
However, when investment is instantaneous investment choices are rich such that rms can either invest at the initial period (Proposition 3), or in the nal period (Proposition 5), or in both periods (subsection 5.3).
We nd in subsection 5.3 that rms invest in both periods only if their initial capacity is too low (i.e., lower than Cournot output). Otherwise, rms invest only once (either in the initial period or in the nal period). When rms invest in both periods the total investment for rm k, as characterized in subsection 5.3, is (1 + g)(p − c − f )/3 − K k0 . On the other hand, the investment with time-to-build
states in the second period. Comparing these investment quantities, clearly the total investment when there is no time-to-build is higher than the investment when there is time-to-build. Note that this comparison holds for a small parameter region in which the initial capacity is too low (0 ≤ K k0 < q c k0 ). This is not a surprising result because of the technological advantage of having the ability of investing instantly. Since rms start with low initial capacities, they invest at the beginning so as to meet the current and the future demand. In the second period they will keep investing to further benet from the demand growth.
Nevertheless, when the investments made just once under both investment types, we com-pare Proposition 1 (time-to-build) to Proposition 3 (instantaneous).
We observe that equilibrium investments are equal if it is beneting upstate demand only. This investment quantity is 
, which is higher than the instantaneous investment in Proposition 3 which equals (1 + g)(2(p − c) − f )/(6(1 + g) − 3θg) − K k0 , if the marginal cost of investment is lower than a bound: f < (θg(p − c))/(1 + g).
Consequently we obtain the following result.
Theorem 1: The ranking of investment quantities with respect to investment types mainly depends on the initial capacity levels. In particular, when investment is instantaneous and rms start with low initial capacities, they can invest every period and their total investments will be higher than the ones observed under time-to-build constraint. Firm investments will be identical under time-to-build and no time-to-build, if rms invest once and this investment only benets the upstate demand. On the other hand, instantaneous investment quantity could be lower than time-to-build investment, if the marginal cost of investment is very low. Also, the ranking of outputs and consumer surplus will follow from the ranking of investment quantities.
Note that instantaneous investment encompasses richer set of equilibrium investment strategies.
Investment can be postponed and made after uncertainty unfolds. Firms can invest at the beginning, at the end, or in both periods. Also, it can benet more demand states. Therefore, the number of equilibria is higher under instantaneous investment than under investment with time lag.
When rms are asymmetric in investment choices, that is while one rm invests the other does not, we nd (by comparing investment policies in Propositions 2 and 4) that under time-to-build constraint the rm's equilibrium investment (weakly) exceeds the investment under no time-to-build.
It is notable that investment decisions under time-to-build (Propositions 1 and 2) or instantaneous investment (Propositions 3 and 4) are both subject to the same demand uncertainty. Investment decision in the initial period I i0 under both structures is made before the realization of demand states in the following period. In the former investment will be used in the following period, while in the latter investment will be used both at the initial and nal periods. 
The Impact of Uncertainty
We observe from demand uncertainty formulation in expression (1) that at time 0 the initial demand is Q 0 =p − P 0 . At time 1 demand will be either Q 1 = (p − P 0 )(1 + g) with probability θ or Q 1 = (p − P 0 ) with probability (1 − θ). The expected demand at time 1 is (p − P 0 )(1 + θg) which is increasing in uncertainty θ. The variance of demand is (p − P 0 ) 2 g 2 θ(1 − θ) which is increasing in θ for θ < 1/2 and decreasing in θ for θ > 1/2. Clearly demand variability becomes zero at θ = 0, and expected demand is the highest as θ approaches one. Favorable resolution of uncertainty implies higher θ which implies higher expected demand and therefore should imply higher investment.
Alternatively, increase in θ makes the upstate demand more likely, and therefore investment made under uncertainty becomes less risky.
Based on the analyses of equilibrium investments with and without investment lag above, we will examine the eect of uncertainty on investment. In the model θ, the probability of demand growth, captures demand uncertainty.
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When investment is subject to time-to-build, from Proposition 1 we observe that θ impacts the investment strategies dierently, depending on the initial capacity levels. The derivative of the investment function with respect to θ, when the initial capacity is low, is g(1+g)(p−c−f )/3(1+g(1− θ)) 2 > 0, and it is, when the initial capacity is high, (1 + g)f /θ 2 > 0. Clearly, these derivatives are positive and implying that investment increases as upstate demand becomes more likely. Moreover, the rate of change of investment with respect to uncertainty has dierent magnitudes, depending on the initial capacity level. In particular, when the initial capacity is low so that investment benets all demand states in the future period, the rate of change of investment is impacted by all model parameters, including the price cap, and marginal costs of production and investment. However, when it is high so that only high demand state benets from the investment, the rate of change of investment is impacted by only the growth rate, the marginal cost of investment, and the likelihood of high demand state. These ndings are also valid when rms are very asymmetric in terms of 7 In Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2003), the probability of positive demand (their parameter a) represents uncertainty.
initial capacities (in Proposition 2).
When investment is instantaneous, we obtain the same qualitative results as in time-to-build case. When investment is made only in the initial period (Proposition 3) or in the both periods (subsection 5.3), the (initial) investment increases in uncertainty and its rate of change with respect to uncertainty varies depending on the level of initial capacity. The only dierence is what happens in the nal period when investment is made in both periods. The uncertainty will not directly impact value of the second period investment. After the initial investment is made, rms will invest in the second period as soon as the high demand state unfolds. This is clear from the equilibrium relation I ku (I k0 ) = (1 + g)(p − c − f )/3 − K k0 − I k0 in subsection 5.3. However, as the value of the random variable impacts the initial investment, it will indirectly impact the quantity of second period investment. Consequently, the higher uncertainty (θ) will increase the quantity of initial investment, which in turn will decrease the quantity of nal period investment.
Next we compare the eect of uncertainty on investment with and without investment lag. When we compare the investment strategies in Propositions 1 and 3, we observe that the investment quantities are the same when the initial capacity is high, and they are dierent when the initial capacity is low. Therefore, the impact of uncertainty would be same whether investment exhibits time-to-build or not, if the initial capacity is high. However, the uncertainty will impact the investment decisions dierently when the initial capacity is low. Specically, the explicit impact of demand uncertainty is as follows. The derivative of investment quantity with respect to θ, under time-to-build (superscript t2b), is
under instantaneous investment (superscript inst). The ratio of these derivatives is (∂I t2b k0 /∂θ)/(∂I inst k0 /∂θ)
2 . Denote this ratio ε, which is higher than 1 if
Clearly, the coecient of the term in the rst bracket is always higher than the coecient of the second one, that is (1 + g) 2 > θ 2 g 2 .
The third term is always positive. Then it is sucient to have the relation p − c > 3f between the marginal costs and the price cap so that the summation of all terms in the above inequality becomes always positive. Therefore, the increase in uncertainty can have a larger impact on investment with time-to-build than investment without time-to-build.
The following theorem summarizes the impact of uncertainty on investments with and without time-to-build.
Theorem 2: The equilibrium investment with or without time-to-build increases in uncertainty.
Depending on the initial capacity, the rate of change of investment with respect to uncertainty can be the same or dierent under both types of investments. Specically, if the initial capacity is high (so that investment will become productive in upstate demand only), then the impact of uncertainty on investment strategies is identical for both investment types. If the initial capacity is low (so that investment will provide benet to all relevant demand states), the eect of uncertainty on investment with time-to-build can be higher than the one with instantaneous investment.
For a given value of θ, we can also measure the impact of demand growth rate g on investment.
The rate of change of investment strategy with respect to demand growth rate is always positive for investments with and without lag. However, their explicit impacts could be dierent. When initial capacity is high the rate of change of investment with respect to g is equal to (p − c − f /θ)/3 > 0 whether investment is subject to time-to-build (Proposition 1) or it is instantaneous (Proposition 3). When initial capacity is low, the derivative of investment with respect to growth rate equals θ(p − c − f )/3(1 + g(1 − θ)) 2 > 0 with time-to-build, and it is θ(2(p − c) − f )/3(2(1 + g) − θg) 2 > 0 without time-to-build. Clearly, the impacts of growth rate are dierent and one can be greater than the other for a given parameter range.
Extensions
Hitherto we have examined two-period competition setting with and without lead time using Markov perfect equilibrium concept. In this section as a robustness check we will extend the competition setting to three periods and analyze investments under open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) concept, which is commonly used in the deterministic dynamic games literature. The dierence between OLNE and MPE will give the strategic value of investment. Specically in subsection 9.1 we will compare and contrast Markov perfect investment strategies to open-loop Nash equilibrium outcomes.
We will show that Markov perfect investment solution coincides with open-loop counterpart under certain conditions, independent of the investment type (instantaneous or not). However, we also pinpoint the conditions under which they predict dierent investment proles in subsection 9.2.
In subsection 9.3, we will extend the time stages to three and examine implications of investment opportunities over time.
Open-loop Nash Equilibrium (OLNE) Investment Solution
This section examines OLNE investment outcomes under uncertainty with and without time-tobuild constraint. Open-loop approach is generally employed as a benchmark case to dierentiate the strategic investment.
Although OLNE may not be subgame perfect in general, equilibrium computations can be tractable and simpler with appropriate reformulation.
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We show that open-loop solution can be equal to Markov perfect one for some capacity levels that we identify. In addition, we note that open-loop equilibria can be used in a moving-horizon approach to approximate a Markov perfect (or closed-loop) equilibrium (see van den Broek (2002) For various initial capacity combinations the OLNE investment policies coincide with the MPE outcomes in this two period game, because there is one time investment opportunity. In fact, there is no impact of initial investment on the future investment, and the strategic impact of one player's investment on the other (namely ∂I ju /∂I i0 ) is zero under both information structures. This is because the capacity constraints of both players are binding which creates corner solutions of the outputs, and the productions will be equal to the available capacities of the players. Therefore, a rm will not be able to aect its rival's output through its investments. In the following proposition we will cover the market condition such that in equilibrium rms choose to investment in the nal period only.
Proposition 9: Assume that investment is instantaneous and both rms invest at the high demand state u. Then open-loop investments are equal to Markov perfect investments.
The intuition for this result is that there is no future after the second period and the initial period decisions have no impact on the future prots because no investment is carried out at the outset of the game. If we were to extend the game to three stages, the dierence between these equilibrium investment strategies would spring from the eect of rst stage investment on the second stage one. This impact, ∂I iu /∂I i0 , is zero in the OLNE and it is minus one in the MPE, which will generate the dierences in equilibrium predictions. The source of this dierence can be traced by backward solution of the MPE.
Extension to Three Periods
In this section we extend the basic investment model with lead time to three periods and characterize MPE investment strategies. Incremental investments under time-to-build is a novel equilibrium (see Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky, 2003). We will show that our main results in the two-stages can be extended to three-stage version of the game for certain parameter regions.
The extension of demand function to three stages (t = 0, 1, 2) produces more demand states and slope of the inverse demand in the last period will be Dierent than Garcia and Shen (2010) who focus on one time investment strategy prole (which they call stationary Markovian investment strategies, on page 33, which is the outcome that is obtained in our two-period model formulation), we oer a dynamic investment strategy prole for rms who invest more than once under time-to-build constraint. Therefore, we will be able to trace the impact of strategic investment in a given period on both the rm's and its rival's investments in the following period.
In the two period version of the game we obtained multiple equilibria depending on the initial capacity. Increasing the number of time stages to three will further raise the possible number of equilibria. At time t, the number of demand states is 2 t , and there are 3 possible capacity status at each demand state (both players' capacities are binding, capacities are not binding, and one player's capacity is binding and it is non-binding for the other). Then at the nal period (t = 2)
there are 81 possible equilibria (3 2 t ), and at time 1 there are 9 possible equilibria. Hence, in the entire game the total possible number of equilibria (including symmetric and asymmetric ones) is 2187 (= 3 * 3 2 * 3 4 ). Characterization of all these equilibria is beyond the scope of this paper.
Even if we would concentrate on symmetric outcomes only, equilibrium investments will be high degree polynomials of model parameters, and hence the equilibrium comparisons would be nontractable. A source of the complexity is that second period investment will be a function of the rst period investment and the capacity constraints might be binding both at the rst and second periods. With its current investment choice rm i is able to aect its future investment levels as well as the rival rm's current and future investment levels. These strategic interactions along with the binding production constraints have lingering eects which would complicate equilibrium predictions. However, to be able to compare the two period results to the three period ones, we will focus on a particular symmetric equilibrium strategy in which rms will only invest if they expect to see the highest demand scenario to be unfolded in each period (this scenario is similar to the one analyzed in Proposition 1). This corresponds to the equilibrium behavior such that rms invest at the initial node in period 0 and the upstate node in period 1. That is, we will characterize equilibrium at which capacity constraints will be binding only at the highest demand scenarios in each time period so that I k0 and I ku is positive. The equilibrium analysis for other possible equilibria would be similar to the proofs of the following propositions.
Proposition 11: Assume a time-to-build constraint between investment and production. When the competition is extended to three periods the MPE and OLNE investments coincide, if production constraints bind only at the up-up (time 2) and the up (time 1) demand states for both rms.
With time-to-build constraint we obtain the equilibrium investment equivalence result under both types of information structures. However, we argue that the same result will apply under no time-to-build. For the sake of briefness we skip the proof, as the mechanics of it will be the same.
Note that we have already proved the investment equivalence result in Propositions 1 and 3 when the production constraints were binding only at the up-state.
As shown in the Appendix, the total investments under both information structures will be identical. Hence the players will produce at the same amounts at the highest possible demand scenario where production constraints will bind and they produce at the capacity. Firms will totally utilize their initial investments as well as the nal investments in each production stage. Moreover, while the equilibrium initial investment will be a function of the initial capacity, the equilibrium nal investment will be independent of the initial capacity.
In Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2003) it is endogeneity of the price premium that leads to incremental investment (p. 172). The price premium is the ratio of dierence of initial price and nal price to nal price. The initial price is a function of the investment made under uncertainty.
Investment is low and hence initial price is high. The nal price is a function of total investment which is the summation of investments made before and after uncertainty. The total investment, which is equal to total output, is higher than initial investment therefore the nal price is lower.
Consequently, the price premium is positive. On the other hand, in the current paper it is the uncertainty in demand growth that leads to incremental investment. Firms split their investments across periods because of demand uncertainty. Prices are higher than Cournot prices due to lower investments and binding capacity constraints.
For the social planner's problem, the planner has several investment opportunities under timeto-build. There will be multiple equilibria (which will have similar characteristics to the two-period planning), and hence below we will only examine optimum investments which will benet both up and up-up states. A sketch of proof of the following result is presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 12: The social planner invests more than the duopolists in the three period version of the game.
Concluding Remarks
While traditional investment models have mainly focused on instantaneous investment decisions from a single rm's perspective, we examine strategic investment decisions in competition settings.
We characterize and analyze investment strategies of rms in markets with dierent investment structures, investment with lead time (or investment under time-to-build) and investment without lead time (or instantaneous investment), in the presence of capacity constraints and uncertainty. In broader terms, comparison of these investment types boils down to comparing progressive industries in which time-to-build is long and signicant relative to the fast-paced industries where time-toinnovate or -build (and then making the products available to the customers) is short. In these terms, a more indirect instance could be that time-to-build would concern industries with heavy R&D process such as designing and making ecient computer chips, operating systems, or airplanes, and the instantaneous investment model would encompass high-tech industries such as cell-phone or personal computer producers.
We compare rms' capital investment behavior based on the investment types and information structures. We nd that for a given investment type equilibrium investment predictions dier across the information structures as long as rms are asymmetric in terms of capacity constraints. In particular, if one rm's capacity constraint is binding and other rm's is not then Markov perfect investment will always be higher than the open-loop investment. These results will follow when the game is extended to three periods.
We oer some new results. The impact of lead time on capital investments is that controlling for demand, and production and investment costs, we determine the conditions under which investments and outputs are higher in progressive industries and the conditions under which they are higher in fast-paced industries. Also, for both investment types (investment with or without time-to-build)
we oer a novel equilibrium in which rms incrementally invest. This behavior is driven by demand uncertainty and capacity constraints. Moreover, in contrast to previous ndings, expected outputs are lower than Cournot outputs as rms face uncertainty. In addition, the amount of uncertainty has dierent eects on investment types.
We examine both two-and three-period versions of the model and nd the same impact of time-to-build constraint on social welfare. Therefore, we argue that this nding would generalize if we were to extend the model to T nite periods. However, due to the tree structure of demand uncertainty and the status of the capacity constraints (binding or not), the number of equilibria will explode, as we explain in the extensions section.
There are several possible future research directions. It would be interesting to explore the dynamics of equilibrium investments when rms employ technologies with dierent lengths of time- To characterize Markov perfect Nash equilibrium investment strategies we start with the nal period and solve the game backwards. The prot at the upstate (denoted u) for rm i is π iu = (p − (q iu + q ju )/(1 + g) − c)q iu , and it is π id = (p − (q id + q jd ) − c)q id when demand stays the same (denoted d). At the initial period rm i chooses the initial investment and output to maximize current and
There are several MPE investment strategies depending on whether constraints are binding or not in the nal period.
i) When initial capacity can meet demand in the intermediate (and initial) state(s) but comes short to meet high demand in the upstate, that is q c kd ≤ K k0 < q c ku holds, rms nd it protable to invest at the outset to benet from high demand in the following period. Once investment is made at time 0 and becomes productive at time 1, the upstate production constraint will bind for both players. That is, investment will be fully utilized and hence no idle capacity will be left out.
The rst order condition for output choice in the upstate is (p − (2q iu + q ju )/(1 + g) − c) = 0
for an interior solution. However, the output will be equal to the capacity as the constraint binds,
The objective function to be maximized at the initial period will be a function of the state variables,
The optimal investment at time 0 will satisfy
ii) When the initial capacity falls into the interval 0 ≤ K k0 < q c kd the investment made at time 0 will benet both up and intermediate demand states at time 1. In this low initial capacity case, both up and intermediate state capacity constraints will bind for both players.
With the binding constraints the prot in the upstate will be v iu (.)
, and the prot in the downstate will be v id (.)
The objective function to be maximized in the initial period as a function of state variables is
The derivative with respect to the optimal investment is
which results in (1b)
Similarly we obtain the investment strategy for rm j,
iii) On the other hand, if the initial capacity is high, that is q c ku ≤ K k0 then rms do not invest in equilibrium: the capacity is sucient to meet the maximum (Cournot) output, and any incremental investment will be idle at a positive cost.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Given rm j's production capacity rm i s investment will benet either upstate demand only or all demand states in period 1. Firm i's equilibrium investment quantities are characterized in a) and b).
a) Investment benets upstate demand and hence only upstate production constraint binds for rm i .
The value function to be maximized in the initial period will be
is the prot in the upstate, and the production quantities are q ju = ((p − c)(1 + g) − q iu )/2, and q iu = K i0 + I i0 .
Also the prot expression in the intermediate state is
, and the interior outputs hold q id < K i0 + I i0 , and q jd < K j0 .
The FOC dv i0 /dI i0 = 0 yields,
Then the solution will be (2a)
As its initial capacity is low, rm i's production is constrained, that is both up and intermediate state constraints bind. Since rm j 's initial capacity is large (dened below) it plays its best response strategy. We optimize the investment choice for rm i.
The objective function in the upstate becomes
Then the maximization of the objective function for rm i yields 
Note that the output of rm j in the upstate will be q ju = ((p − c)(1 + g) − q iu )/2, where 
We then obtain the upper bound of the rm j's initial capacity K j0 ≥ ((p − c)(1 + g) − β)/2 = (3q c ju − β)/2, which ensures that rm j never invests and produces at the interior output level.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The MPE solution involves several equilibrium possibilities due to the capacity constraints: At each decision stage (node on the demand tree) there are two possible outcomes; either production is interior or constrained by the capacity. Since we have three demand states in the two periods, we have eight output possibilities. However, only several of them are feasible and part of the equilibrium behavior. The feasible investment scenarios will emerge under the following conditions: i) All capacity constraints bind in the two periods; ii) The production constraints bind only in the upstate demand; iii) The constraints never bind so that production is interior and there is no investment. These cases are mutually exclusive and will result in dierent investment strategies.
Other scenarios such as binding constraints in the initial and the second period upstate demands are ruled out because of contradicting capacity constraints.
The objective function to be maximized in the second period upstate demand for rm i will be,
In the second period intermediate state it will be,
The conditions under which rms only invest at the outset will be derived below. We start with examining three cases separately and characterize equilibrium investment strategies.
i) When the initial capacity for any rm, say rm i, is low enough, that is K i0 +I i0 ≤ q c id satised, the investment will benet the initial node as well as up and intermediate states in the second period. That is, initial investment will benet all demand states and the production constraints will be binding.
The objective function to be maximized for rm i in the initial period will be,
The optimality condition for investment choice is dv i0 /dI i0 = 0 which yields
When the constraint at the initial stage binds, (K i0 + I i0 − q i0 ) = 0, we will have λ i0 ≥ 0, which can be obtained by solving,
Inserting this into (3a) and solving the same problem for player j, we obtain
This yields the optimal investment function for rm k = i, j, i = j
This is the investment strategy when the production constraints bind in all demand states. To have this investment scenario hold, K i0 + I i0 ≤ q c i0 must be satised.
ii) Since the highest demand level is reached in the second period upstate, one should consider whether it is optimum to invest in the initial period and have the capacity fully utilized in the upstate. This case occurs when the condition q c kd ≤ K k0 < q c ku holds, that is when the initial capacity is high enough so that it does not benet the intermediate or initial state but low enough so that initial investment provides benet in the upstate only.
For rm i the value function to be maximized in the initial period will be
The necessary condition dv i0 /dI i0 = 0 yields,
, where λ i0 = 0 holds. Then the solution for both rms are,
This is the investment quantity when the production constraint binds only in the upstate.
In the nal case iii), the investment quantity is zero in equilibrium because production constraints never bind. This is due to high initial capacities.
Proof of Proposition 4:
If rm j's production capacity is high so that K j0 ≥ ((p − c)(1 + g) − γ)/2 is satised then rm i's investment will hold either a) or b) below. a) Firm i's production constraint binds upstate only.
, and q ju = ((p−c)(1+g)−q iu )/2,
, where q id < K i0 + I i0 , and q jd < K j0 .
The solution will be (4a)
b) Capacity constraints bind in all states.
The optimization dv i0 /dI i0 = 0 yields,
The maximization of the objective function for rm i yields
, and q jd = (p − c − q id )/2, and q i0 = K i0 + I i0 , and q j0 = (p − c − q i0 )/2. Then the MPE investment for rm i boils down to (4b)
Then we obtain the upper bound of rm j's initial capacity K j0 ≥ ((p − c)(1 + g) − γ)/2 = (3q c ju − γ)/2, which ensures that rm j's production is interior and never invests.
Proof of Proposition 5:
If rms are investing at the second period, then they are facing the high demand market that is the upstate demand. If both rms invest then their production constraints will be binding in the upstate because rms' investments will be fully utilized and there will be no idle capacity left.
In the case of investment beneting the upstate only, the value function to be maximized for rm i will be
The necessary condition dv iu /dI iu = 0 yields,
Then MPE investment solution for both rms is
Proof of Proposition 7:
In characterizing the OLNE investments, we will examine the same cases we studied for MPE characterization.
The prot function to be maximized for player i is
where Λ is a function of the Lagrange multipliers and equals
Case 1 : Upstate constraint is binding for both players.
The rst order conditions for player i are ∂π i ∂I i0 = −f + λ iu = 0, and
Solving them simultaneously yields
Solving investment expressions for both players, the equilibrium investment function will be (7a) The maximization of the objective function for rm i yields
, and q iu = K i0 + I i0 = q id . The investment expression for rm i becomes,
. Similarly we can obtain the investment expression for rm j. Solving them simultaneously yields the optimal OLNE investments,
Note that investments will be identical for both rms as long as initial capacities are the same.
Proof of Proposition 8:
Case A: This is the case in which all capacity constraints bind in all periods.
The objective function to be maximized in the initial period is,
, and
The rst order necessary condition dv i0 /dI i0 = 0 yields
When the constraints bind, we will have λ i0 , λ iu , λ id ≥ 0.
Inserting these into the above rst order condition and solving the same problem for player j,
we obtain
Observe that the open-loop investment strategy is exactly same as the Markov perfect investment strategy characterized earlier. This investment will hold for the same parameter region as dened for the Markov perfect investment.
Case B: Since the highest demand level is reached in the second period upstate, one should consider whether it is optimal to invest in the initial period and have the capacity constraint binding in the upstate demand alone, given that rms employ open-loop investment strategies.
Inserting them into (B.2) and solving the same problem for player j, we obtain
Clearly this investment expression is identical to the MPE investments.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Open-loop Solution
All capacity constraints bind in the second period upstate
The objective function to be maximized in the initial period will be,
The rst order necessary condition dv i0 /dI iu = 0 yields λ iu − θf = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i = j, where
Solving for the optimal investment leads to We rst start the equilibrium investment analysis with time-to-build. We will prove this when only upstate production constraint binds for rm i. Note that we have already analyzed the case in which both constraints bind and one of the rms invests in the earlier section.
With instantaneous investment
The corresponding scenario in the instantaneous investment would be the case in which rm i invests at t = 1 high demand state only and its capacity constraint binds in that state.
Under Markov perfect equilibrium, the investment strategy is obtained as follows. The value function to be maximized in the initial period is v i0 = q i0 (p − q i0 − q j0 − c) + θv iu (.) + (1 − θ)v id (.) + λ i0 (K i0 + I i0 − q i0 ),
where v iu (I i0 ) = (K i0 + I iu )(p − c − (K i0 + I iu + q ju )/(1 + g)) − f I iu , and q ju = ((p − c)(1 + g) − K i0 − I iu )/2, also v id (.) = q id (p − q id − q jd − c).
The FOC dv i0 /dI iu = 0 yields, θ[p − c − (K i0 + I iu + (p − c)(1 + g))/2(1 + g) − (K i0 + I iu )/2(1 + g) − f ] = 0.
The solution is
Under open-loop equilibrium, the investment prole is characterized as follows. Note that all capacity constraints bind in the second period upstate.
where v iu (I i0 , I j0 ) = [q iu (p−c−(q iu +q ju )/(1+g))−f I iu ], and v id (I i0 , I j0 ) = [q id (p−q i0 −q j0 −c)].
The rst order necessary conditions dv i0 /dI iu = 0 yield λ iu − θf = 0, and λ iu = θ(p − (2q iu + q ju )/(1 + g) − c), q iu = K i0 + I iu , and q ju = ((p − c)(1 + g) − q iu )/2
Solving for the equilibrium investment results in
An alternative scenario can also emerge. In the instantaneous investment case it is likely that a rm invests at t = 0 and its capacity constraint binds in the upstate demand alone, because the highest demand level is reached in the second period upstate.
The corresponding Markov perfect equilibrium investment strategy has the following property.
where v iu (I i0 , I j0 ) = (K i0 +I i0 )(p−c−(K i0 +I i0 +q ju )/(1+g)), and v id (.) = q id (p−q id −q jd −c).
The FOC dv i0 /dI i0 = 0 yields, −f + λ i0 + θ[p − c − (K i0 + I i0 + (p − c)(1 + g))/2(1 + g) − (K i0 + I i0 )/2(1 + g)] = 0, where assume interior initial output without loss of generality and hence λ i0 = 0.
The equilibrium is
Also, the corresponding open-loop equilibrium investment strategy is obtained as follows.
The rst order necessary condition dv i0 /dI i0 = 0 yields −f + λ i0 + λ iu = 0, where λ iu = θ(p − c − (2(K i0 + I i0 ) + ((p − c)(1 + g) − (K i0 + I i0 ))/2)/(1 + g)) = 0, and λ i0 = 0.
The equilibrium investment will be
Clearly, for all cases examined the MPE investments are higher than the OLNE investments.
Proof of Proposition 11:
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) Solution
Since the production constraints at the up-up (at time 2) and up (at time 1) states will be binding for both players, the prot expression in the nal period up-up state is π iuu = (K i0 + I i0 + I iu )(p − for i, j = 1, 2, i = j.
Then
∂I iu ∂I i0 = −1, and ∂I ju ∂I i0 = 0.
The optimality condition for the initial period investment is, dπ i0 dI i0 = ∂π i0 ∂I i0 + θ ∂π iu ∂I i0 = 0, as the production constraints bind only in the up (u) and up-up (uu)
states.
∂π iu ∂I i0 = −f ∂I iu ∂I i0 + (m − (2(K i0 + I i0 ) + K j0 + I j0 )/(1 + g) + θ ∂π iuu ∂I i0
Given I j0 we optimize with respect to I i0 : ∂π iuu ∂I i0 = (1 + ∂I iu ∂I i0 )(m − (K i0 + I i0 + I iu + K j0 + I j0 + I ju )/(1 + g) 2 ) + (K i0 + I i0 + I iu )(0 − (1 + ∂I iu ∂I i0 )/(1 + g) 2 ) = 0 due to ∂I iu ∂I i0 = −1. The prot function to be maximized at the outset of the game is, π i0 (.) = (p − (q i0 + q j0 ) − c)q i0 − f I i0 + θv iu (.) + (1 − θ)v id (.) + λ i0 (K i0 − q i0 ). In the three period planning the optimality conditions are, q 0 =p−c for the initial output, −f +λ u +λ uu = 0 for the initial investment, and θ(p−c−q u /(1+ g)) = λ u and θ 2 (p − c − q uu /(1 + g) 2 ) = λ uu for the upstate and the up-upstate outputs, resp. Also, the optimality condition for the upstate investment satises −θf + λ uu = 0. When the production constraints is binding in the upstate and up-upstate, the optimal investments will be I 0 = (1+g)(p− c)−f (1−θ)(1+g)/θ−K 0 at the initial period and I u = (1+g) 2 (p−c−f /θ)−(1+g)(p−c−f (1−θ)/θ).
Hence, the total capacity at the nal period will be K 0 + I 0 + I u = (1 + g) 2 (p − c − f /θ). Note that second period investment is independent of the initial capacity, and the total capacity at the nal period is also irrelevant of the initial capacity.
